We build a Dynamic General Equilibrium model with search frictions for the allocation of physical capital and investigate its implications for the business cycle. While the model is in principle capable of generating substantial internal propagation to small exogenous shocks, the quantitative effects are modest once we calibrate the model to fit firm-level capital flows. We then extend the model with credit market frictions that lead to countercyclical default and countercyclical risk premia as in the data. Countercyclical default directly affects capital reallocation and has important general equilibrium income effects on labor supply. Yet, for calibrations in line with observed consumption dynamics, we find that even in this extended model, search frictions in physical capital markets play only a small role for business cycle fluctuations.
Introduction
Physical capital is often speci…c to a certain task and/or …xed to a particular location. These speci…cities imply that physical capital markets are subject to potentially important allocation frictions. Most of the modern macro literature has ignored these market imperfections and examined instead the e¤ects of aggregate investment constraints such as time-to-build delays (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982) or convex adjustment costs (e.g. Cogley and Nason, 1995) . The general conclusion from this literature is that in general equilibrium, such aggregate investment constraints have relatively small business cycle e¤ects on their own. In this paper, we investigate whether the same holds true for market imperfections. In particular, we introduce search frictions for the allocation of physical capital into an otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC) model and ask whether these imperfections help generate more ampli…ed and persistent responses to small exogenous shocks.
Our investigation is motivated by empirical evidence from industry-and …rm-level data, discussed in detail in Section 2, that lead to three stylized observations. First, depending on the degree of speci…city, a substantial amount of physical capital remains unmatched in any given period. Second, congestion in the physical capital market is countercyclical from the point of view of the supplier; i.e. the probability of (re-)allocating a given unit of capital to a …rm increases in business cycle upturns and inversely decreases in downturns. Third, the distribution of investment rates across individual …rms is wide, even in narrowly de…ned sectors and independent of aggregate conditions. The three observations suggest that physical capital markets are characterized by similar frictions than labor markets and thus, our modelization draws on the now widely employed search approach for the labor market, pioneered by Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and introduced into the DGE context by Merz (1995) , Andolfatto (1996) and Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) .
The model we develop in Section 3 is populated by representative households and …rms.
Firms must post projects at a cost to search for available physical capital that is supplied endogenously by households. 1 The probability of a match varies with the state of the economy 1 As opposed to most labor search models where the supply of available workers is …xed, we endogenize the supply of available capital for the model to be consistent with balanced growth properties of aggregate capital stocks. 2 and depends on the ratio of available capital to the total number of posted projects. Once matched, households keep lending their capital to the same …rm until separation, which is assumed to occur with exogenous probability in the baseline model. Once separated, the capital returns to the household for reallocation.
Under relatively weak conditions, the proposed search environment implies countercyclical congestion in physical capital markets, as in the data. This mechanism has potentially important aggregate consequences. In the wake of a positive technology shock, for example, the decrease in allocation frictions together with the presence of readily available unmatched capital means that the reaction of productive matched capital stocks and indirectly labor demand is more important than in the RBC benchmark. This e¤ect continues over several periods after the shock and may lead to more ampli…ed and persistent output dynamics.
To assess the quantitative importance of the search friction, Section 4 calibrates the model to …t long-run averages of …rm-level capital ‡ows using Compustat data and compares its business cycle characteristics with the ones of the RBC benchmark. The main result is that capital ‡ows in and out of production are not important enough for search frictions to have a signi…cant impact. Only when we increase separation and reallocation to counterfactually large ‡ows does the model generate more ampli…ed and persistent output dynamics.
Based on this result, Section 5 extends the baseline model with credit market frictions.
Following Townsend (1979) , …rms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks that occur after all optimal decisions are taken and that households (the lenders) can observe only after incurring a monitoring cost. This costly state veri…cation problem implies an optimal debt contract that results in endogenous capital separation through default. In particular, households monitor all loss-making …rms and sever the lending relationship with those whose productivity level is below some threshold that makes re…nancing more expensive than reallocating the capital to another …rm.
The extension is motivated by the observation that di¤erent measures of …nancial distress and related capital sales / liquidations are countercyclical. Similar to Den Haan, Ramey and Watson's (2000) argument that countercyclical job destruction generates substantial internal propagation in labor search models, countercyclical capital separations in our model may magnify and prolong the e¤ects of exogenous shocks as more (less) capital gets separated in downturns 3 (upturns) and needs to go through a time-consuming reallocation process. 2 As an interesting by-product, the extended model also allows us to assess the importance of taking into account costly capital reallocation when quantifying the business cycle e¤ects of credit frictions. In fact, existing DGE models with costly state veri…cation such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) only investigate the e¤ects of net worth on investment and output but ignore the reallocation of capital from bankrupt …rms. With the exception of a few special cases, these net worth e¤ects alone have relatively small consequences for business cycle ‡uctuations. It is therefore interesting to see how the addition of costly capital reallocation changes this result. 3 As the quantitative analysis reveals, the extended model indeed generates countercyclical capital separations as well as countercyclical risk premia, in line with the data. This latter result constitutes an improvement over the credit friction models of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) where risk premia are either procyclical or acyclical. 4 The extended model also implies more volatile and persistent output ‡uctuations. Closer inspection reveals, however, that the increased internal propagation is mostly a general equilibrium e¤ect brought about by a smaller (or even inverse) reaction of household consumption and thus labor supply to exogenous shocks. Once we calibrate the model such as to match the consumption dynamics in the data, the extended model implies only modest ampli…cation and persistence.
The conclusion of the paper thus remains that capital separation and reallocation ‡ows on their own are too small for search frictions in physical capital markets to play an important role for business cycle ‡uctuations.
The results of our paper mostly concur with existing studies on the business cycle e¤ects of physical capital speci…cities. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , for example, examine the aggregate e¤ects of large military spending shocks in a world where moving capital from one sector to 2 By contrast to Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) where job destruction is an e¢ cient outcome, capital separations in our model are the consequence of an information friction and thus socially ine¢ cient. As we discuss in Section 5, this assumption is based on …rm-level evidence indicating that capital separations due to (presumably e¢ cient) sales and mergers are mildly procyclical rather than countercyclical.
3 Section 5 provides more details about the business cycle e¤ects of the net worth channel of credit frictions. 4 As we discuss in Section 5, the countercyclical risk premium is a direct consequence of the time-varying costs of incomplete contracting in a world with ex-post factor speci…city that Willamson (1979) or more recently Caballero and Hammour (1996) term the fundamental transformation problem.
4
another is subject to a time-delay and a …xed cost. For certain speci…cations, they report some output ampli…cation e¤ects. However, these e¤ects are based on unusually important sectoral shifts and the model is not analyzed in a full-blown DGE context. Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001), in turn, consider a model with habit persistence and one-period in ‡exibilities for both labor and capital. While their focus is mostly on asset pricing implications, their model is capable of generating substantial persistence in output growth. However, this result seems to be due mostly to the imposed adjustment delay on hours worked. Finally, Veracierto (2002) examines the e¤ects of investment irreversibilities and concludes that they do not matter for the business cycle. 5 The main contribution of our paper compared to these studies is that we focus more squarely on the time-varying nature of the market imperfections involved in the allocation of physical capital. First, we document that congestion in the physical capital market is countercyclical. Second, we introduce search frictions to capture the state-dependent nature of this congestion and show that it has interesting consequences in general equilibrium, mostly through its indirect e¤ect on labor supply. 6 Third, we are, to our knowledge, the …rst to explicitly calibrate a DGE model to gross capital ‡ows from …rm-level data. The relative unimportance of these capital ‡ows (compared to, say, labor ‡ows) is the main reason for our conclusion that search frictions in physical capital markets play only a modest role for business cycle ‡uctuations.
Empirical evidence
To motivate our extension of the RBC benchmark, this section …rst provides evidence on the time-varying nature of market imperfections in the allocation and reallocation of physical capital.
Second, we review empirical studies on the wide distribution of investment rates across …rms. 5 A recent literature examines the role of nonconvexities in plant-level adjustment costs for aggregate investment dynamics, which can be considered as a combination of costs to both allocation of new capial and reallocation of used capital. See for example Kahn and Thomas (2006a) 
Allocation frictions for physical capital
Most physical capital is speci…c to a certain task and/or …xed to a particular location. The market imperfections brought about by these speci…cities are likely to imply substantial costs for the allocation and reallocation of physical capital. Similar to the labor market, one can think of these costs as search frictions that depend on the degree of speci…city and potentially vary with business conditions. Unlike for the labor market where we observe aggregate unemployment and job advertisement rates, however, there is no comprehensive direct evidence on "unemployed" capital or un…lled investment projects. 7 Nevertheless, a substantial amount of indirect evidence exists that allows at least a partial characterization of the frictions involved.
We start by considering the market for leased non-residential property, which is one of the capital types most comparable to labor in the sense that similar to unemployment, vacant space is directly observable. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average U.S. vacancy rate for industrial and o¢ ce space in competitively leased multi-tenant buildings between 1988 and 2006.
We obtained these data series from Torto Wheaton Richard Ellis, a large commercial real estate …rm that surveys all major U.S. property markets on a quarterly basis. jumping up again at the onset of the 2001 recession. On average, these vacancy rates are substantial (9.5% for industrial space and 14.5% for o¢ ce space) and their time-varying nature suggests that congestion in the non-residential property market (from the point of view of the proprietor) varies inversely with the business cycle. 8 Industrial and o¢ ce space is, of course, a very speci…c type of capital because it is bound to a particular location and can hardly be converted for alternative usage. On the other end of the spectrum are newly …nished, relatively mobile capital goods. Here, the BEA's Survey of Current Business (2000) allows us to observe detailed time series on inventories and output from capital goods producing industries. Using this information, we can compute the hazard rate q it with which a new unit of capital good i is allocated as follows:
with v it and y it denoting end-of-period t inventories and output during period t of capital good i, respectively. Table 1 reports the results for three large categories of …nished capital goods over the sample 1977 to 1999. As expected, the allocation rate for these capital goods is closer to unity (no friction) as production can be adjusted to accommodate demand and none of the capital types is bound to a speci…c location. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that industrial machinerypresumably a more speci…c capital good -takes on average longer to be allocated (i.e. a lower 8 Unfortunately, Torto Wheaton does not provide information on newly vacated space and, to our knowledge, none of the U.S. statistical agencies provides comparable data on the non-residential property market. Hence, we cannot compute hazard rates for the transition out of vacancy as it possible for the labor market where we have separate time series on newly unemployed individuals (e.g. Shimer, 2005) .
q) and congestion in that market reacts more inversely with the business cycle (i.e. the allocation rate q is more procyclical). 9 Aside from these direct measures, there is a host of indirect evidence about the importance By contrast, di¤erent measures of the bene…ts from reallocation (dispersion in …rm level Tobin's Q, …rm level investment rates, total factor productivity growth rates, and capacity utilization) are all countercyclical. If there were no reallocation frictions or if the degree of congestion in the used capital market was constant, we would expect most reallocations to take place when the bene…ts are greatest. Yet, exactly the opposite is the case.
Another piece of indirect evidence about reallocation frictions for used capital comes from a case study by Ramey and Shapiro (2001) who measure the resale value of equipment after the closure of three aeronautical plants. They …nd that other aerospace companies are overrepresented among buyers, and that even after taking into account age-related depreciation, the average resale value of equipment is only 28% of the replacement cost. 11 Although some of these losses may be due to unaccounted obsoleteness, Ramey and Shapiro's results suggest that the frictions involved in the reallocation of used capital are substantial. Otherwise, the used capital would not sell at such a large discount below its productive value. 9 The traditional explanation for the existence of inventories relies on the assumption that production is costly to adjust. As a result, …rms use inventories to smooth production when faced with ‡uctuating sales (e.g. Blinder and Maccini, 1991). An alternative explanation relies on the existence of …xed delivery costs, inciting …rms to hold inventory stocks. Firms thus make adjustments only when stocks are su¢ ciently far from their target (e.g. Kahn and Thomas, 2006b ). Our argument of congestion di¤ers from these explanations in the sense that we interpret the variation in hazard rates for inventory exit across goods as evidence of di¤erent degrees of market imperfections. 1 0 Compustat collects a wide range of data, including information on physical capital, for all publicly traded …rms in the U.S. We discuss this dataset in more detail in the calibration part of Section 4. 1 1 Even for machine tools, which typically have a better resale value than specialized aerospace equipment, the resale value is only about 40% relative to the replacement cost.
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Besides market imperfections in general, the speci…city embodied in most physical capital can lead to an additional equilibrium e¤ect that Shleifer and Vishny (1992) call asset illiquidity and that may explain part of the surprisingly low resale prices reported in Ramey and Shapiro's case study. Shleifer and Vishny argue that when …rms sell assets or liquidate to meet …nancial constraints, the speci…c nature of capital means that the buyers who value these assets most are likely to be …rms in the same industry. But …nancial distress often a¤ects industries as a whole, which means that these buyers are likely to be …nancially constrained as well. As a result, the assets are sold at a steep discount within the same industry or to less constrained industry outsiders who have a lower valuation because the characteristics of the sold asset are suboptimal for their line of business or because they cannot value the asset appropriately. 12 Pulvino (1998) provides evidence about the countercyclical nature of asset illiquidity from the used aircraft market. Based on U.S. data of commercial aircraft transactions, Pulvino …nds that …nancially constrained airlines sell aircrafts at a 14% discount to the average market price, but that these discounts exist only in times when the airline industry is depressed and not when it is booming. Furthermore, aircraft leasing institutions pay a discount of 30% during industry recessions because they themselves value aircrafts much lower than the actual airlines and because the risk associated with …nding another lessee during recessions is much higher than in upturns.
A (2005) show that investment at the plant level is characterized by a wide distribution. At any given point in time, there is a substantial mass of establishments with zero investment that coexists with establishments that have investment rates above 20% of their capital stock (i.e. investment spikes). 14 Most of the literature has interpreted this large distribution of investment rates across establishments as the result of plant-speci…c productivity and non-convex adjustment costs that lead to (S,s) type investment rules (e.g. Khan and Thomas, 2006a and references therein). While this approach is certainly capable of rationalizing the observed data, the wide distribution of investment rates -even in narrowly de…ned sectors -a¤ords another, potentially complementary explanation; one that focuses on market imperfections in the allocation of physical capital. In fact, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence suggesting that in expansionary periods, …rms face sometimes substantial di¢ culties in securing a reliable supplier of capital goods. 15 rate for separated capital from …rm death even lower. On the other hand, some of the separated capital may be exported abroad in which case the e¤ective absorption rate is higher. 1 4 Becker et al. (2005) recon…rm these …ndings in their summary using plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). 1 5 Interestingly, Statistics Canada collects information on intended capital purchases in one of their …rm-level surveys that could be compared over time to actual expenditures. Unfortunately, this information is not publicly available at the moment. 10 
Model
As in the frictionless RBC benchmark, our model is populated by two agents: …rms that produce using capital and labor; and households who decide on optimal consumption, leisure and investments in productive capital. But instead of instantaneous allocation, the matching of capital from households with …rms involves a costly and time-consuming search process. This search process is in principle very similar to the standard labor search environment (e.g. Andolfatto, 1996) , with the exception that we endogenize the supply of available capital. This complication is necessary because depreciated capital needs to be replaced and, more importantly, because we want our model to be consistent with the stylized fact that output and capital grow on average at the same rate.
At the same time, our model retains a number of other simpli…cations that facilitate comparison with the RBC benchmark. First, there is no distinct sector for capital allocation. Instead, households directly act as capital lenders. Second, the same matching friction applies to the allocation of both new and used (i.e. previously separated) capital. This renders the analysis considerably easier as we do not need to keep track of di¤erent types of capital. Third, production is constant-returns-to-scale. Firms therefore choose the same optimal capital-labor ratio, independent of …rm size, which allows us to abstract from …rm heterogeneity.
Search and matching in the capital market
Capital is either in a productive state or in a liquid state. We de…ne by K t the capital stock that enters the production function of a representative …rm in period t. Liquid capital L t , in turn, is made up of two components: used capital that has been separated previously from other …rms and new capital made available by households.
To undertake investments, …rms must post projects and search for liquid capital at cost per project. We denote by V t the total number of posted projects in period t. Total capital additions to production in period t is the result of a matching process m(L t ; V t ), with @m( )=@L t > 0 and @m( )=@V t > 0: A …rm's probability to …nd capital is therefore given by p( t ) = m(Vt;Lt) Vt
Vt is a measure of congestion in the physical capital market from the household's point of view (i.e. the capital supplier). Likewise, the probability of liquid capital being matched to a …rm equals q( t ) = m(Vt;Lt) Lt with @q( t )=@ t < 0. 16 Firms and households are assumed to be su¢ ciently small to take p( t ) and q( t ) as exogenous.
Capital matched to a …rm in period t 1 enters production in period t. This match between …rm and capital continues into period t + 1 with probability (1 s) and so on for the periods thereafter. Hence, the evolution of the capital stock is described by 17
With probability s, the match is terminated, in which case a fraction ' net of depreciation of the capital is returned to the household; i.e. the household receives '(1 )sK t . The remainder
(1 ')(1 )sK t is a deadweight loss incurred during the separation process. Note that in this baseline formulation of our model, we keep the separation rate s exogenous. In Section 5 below,
we introduce credit market frictions to endogenize the separation rate.
Firms and households
At the beginning of each period, …rms and households observe exogenous aggregate technology X t . Given the existing capital stock K t ; the representative …rm then posts new projects V t at unit cost and hires labor N t to produce output Y t with constant-returns-to-scale technology
with f N , f K > 0 and f N N , f KK < 0. The resulting pro…t maximization problem is described by
where t is the rental rate of capital; W t is the wage per unit of labor; and E t t+1 t is the discount factor of future cash ‡ows. This discount factor is a function of the marginal utility of consumption because the …rm transfers all pro…ts to the households. The …rm takes W t and t as exogenous. The exogeneity of W t is a direct consequence of our assumption of competitive labor markets. The exogeneity of t , in turn, implies that …rms do not internalize the e¤ects of their capital stock on the marginal productivity of capital and thus on the negotiation of t (see below).
The …rst-order conditions of the optimization problem are
Equation (3) is the standard labor demand. Equation (4) states that the expected discounted marginal value of an additional unit of matched capital has to equal its average cost =p( t ),
with the marginal value of an additional matched unit of capital J K (K) being de…ned as
This equation states that the value to the …rm of an additional unit of capital is worth today's marginal product of capital net of the rental rate plus the expected future value net of depreciation in case the match is continued.
Households maximize the expected discounted ‡ow of utility u(C t ; 1 N t ) over consumption C t , leisure 1 N t and the amount of liquid capital L t destined for matching with …rms. Time spent working yields revenue W t N t , capital matched last period yields revenue t K t , while unmatched capital is carried into the present period with zero net return. Formally, this problem is described by
is the quantity of unmatched capital in the beginning of t; D t are …rm pro…ts transferred to households, and '(1 )sK t is the amount of separated capital returned into the budget constraint. Similar to the …rm's optimization problem, we assume that the household considers W t and t as exogenous.
13
The …rst two conditions are standard. The third condition states that the discounted expected utility of a marginal unit of liquid capital L t must equal the marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption. With probability (1 q( t )) liquid capital remains unmatched and is worth V U (U t+1 ; K t+1 ) to the household, while with probability q( t ) it is matched with a project and turned into productive capital with marginal value V K (U t+1 ; K t+1 ). From the above Bellman equation, we can derive these marginal values as
Rental rate of capital and equilibrium
To close the model, we follow much of the labor search literature and assume that once matched, households and …rms determine the rental rate of capital by Nash bargaining over the surplus of the match. The relevant surplus is the sum of marginal bene…ts to each party:
De…ning as the household's relative bargaining power, the household thus
After some algebraic manipulations that are detailed in the appendix, we obtain the following expression for the rental rate 18
The …rst term in brackets is the maximum amount the …rm is willing to pay per unit of capital.
It equals the marginal product of capital plus the average cost that is saved by entering the proposed capital match rather than continuing to search. The second term in brackets is the household's opportunity cost of entering the proposed capital match, which equals the fraction 1 8 The appendix is available on the authors'website (http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r16374) 14 not lost to depreciation when capital remains liquid, , plus the deadweight loss in case the capital gets separated (1 ')(1 )s.
As mentioned before, the constant-returns-to-scale assumption for technology implies that all …rms choose the same optimality conditions. The equilibrium of the economy is thus de…ned by the system of equations (1)- (11) and the de…nition of aggregate dividends D t = Y t W t N t t K t V t (see appendix for details). Dividends are positive because the search friction gives rise to a surplus for each unit of matched capital that the …rm and household split as speci…ed above.
Comparison with the RBC benchmark and qualitative considerations
In the following analysis, it will be useful to compare our capital search model with the RBC benchmark where capital can be allocated costlessely and instantaneously (see for example King and Rebelo, 2000) . In fact, our model collapses to the RBC benchmark for the case where the cost of project postings and the deadweight loss from separations 1 ' are both zero. Firms then post an in…nity of projects and all capital is reallocated in the beginning of each period; i.e. s = 1; q( t ) = 1 and U t = 0. Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the repayment on liquidity equals the marginal product of capital: t = f K (X t N t ; K t ). 19 Furthermore, choosing liquid capital L t amounts to directly choosing the new stock of capital K t+1 . This implies a value of matched liquidity V K (U t ; K t ) = t [ t + (1 )], and the optimality condition for the choice of liquidity (i.e. new investment) reduces to the standard Euler equation:
Finally, by combining the household's budget constraint with the …rm's …rst-order conditions and the capital accumulation equation, we recover the familiar national accounting identity of the RBC benchmark
The national accounting identity of our capital search model is quite di¤erent. Speci…cally, the household's budget constraint together with the de…nition of dividends yields
The …rst term in brackets on the right-hand side represents the total resources devoted to gross investment by households and …rms. The second term in brackets denotes idle capital in the form of newly separated capital and unmatched capital from the previous period. The di¤erence between the two quantities de…nes net new investment. Idle capital thus drives a wedge in the economy's resource constraint that increases the amount e¤ectively made available to …rms without a¤ecting consumption. Akin to unemployment in models with labor market frictions, the presence of these additional resources may magnify and prolong the economy's reaction to shocks.
The second potential source of internal propagation in our model is the state-dependent nature of the search friction. In response to a persistent increase in aggregate productivity X t , the marginal value of future matched capital increases. By virtue of conditions (4) and (8), …rms and households thus …nd it optimal to increase V t and L t , respectively. Which of the two responses is larger depends on the exact speci…cation of the model and thus, we cannot say in general whether congestion in the physical capital market is procyclical or countercyclical.
However, by combining (4) and (8) with the de…nition of the division of the surplus, we can
show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Congestion in the physical capital market -de…ned as the ratio of liquidity to project postings t L t =V t -is increasing in the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption.
Proof: see appendix.
Under relatively weak conditions, this proposition implies that congestion is countercyclical, as evidenced in the data. For example, if preferences are additive and concave in consumption, t is inversely related to consumption growth. Since consumption reacts gradually to persistent changes in aggregate productivity (e.g. Fig. 10 in King and Rebelo, 2000) , congestion decreases in business cycle upturns and inversely increases in downturns. This countercyclical behavior of congestion has two e¤ects. First, capital stocks react proportionally more after impact than if no search frictions were present. Second, the decrease in congestion implies that household's devote a relatively smaller share of their resources to liquid capital and consume relatively more. As a result, the income e¤ect on labor supply is larger and depresses the response of equilibrium hours on impact. But because the subsequent shift in labor demand is larger (as capital stocks accumulate faster), equilibrium hours may respond more in the periods after the shock. These e¤ects together have the potential to generate ampli…ed yet hump-shaped (i.e. persistent) responses of hours and output to technology shocks.
Quantitative evaluation
We explore the quantitative implications of search frictions in the allocation of capital by comparing the business cycle performance of our capital matching model to the RBC benchmark in terms of impulse response functions (IRFs) and unconditional second moments.
Shocks and functional forms
Following much of the RBC literature, we assume that the exogenous labor-augmenting shock X t has both a deterministic trend part X t and a stochastic transitory part A t . In particular
X t . The deterministic trend part evolves according to X t = g X t 1 , with g > 1, and the stochastic transitory part evolves according to
with " A t~( 0; 2 A ). 20 For household preferences, we follow King and Rebelo's (2000) baseline speci…cation and de…ne the family's period utility as u(C; 1 N ) = log C + ! 1 (1 N ) 1 . For production, we assume a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale of the form f (XN; K) = A( XN ) 1 K with 0 < < 1. Finally, we follow much of the labor search literature and specify the matching technology as a Cobb-Douglas m(V; L) = V L 1 with 0 < < 1. This constant returns to scale assumption implies that p( t ) = t q( t ), which turns out to simplify the steady state computations in our model.
2 0 The assumption of a deterministic trend in labor productivity implies that we need to normalize all aggregates by Xt so as to obtain a stationary system that we then simulate using the log-linear rational expectations solution algorithm of King and Watson (1998) . We thank Bob King for providing us with the relevant Matlab code.
Alternatively, we could have speci…ed a stochastic technology shock that is di¤erence stationary. Our results are robust to such an alternative speci…cation of the shock process.
Calibration
We calibrate our model to U.S. quarterly data. For the parameters that are common with the RBC benchmark, we use calibrations that are standard in the literature (e.g. King and Rebelo, 2000) . We set g = 1:004 and = 0:992 so as to match an annual mean trend growth rate of 1.6% and an average annual real yield on a riskless 3-month treasury bill of 4.95%. For the labor supply, we …x the parameter ! such that the average fraction of hours worked equals n = 0:2.
Together with = 4, this results in a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. Furthermore, we set the share of capital in the production function to = 1=3, and the rate of depreciation of capital to = 0:025. Finally, to calibrate the exogenous driving process for the temporary technology shock, we extract a Solow residual from the data and then subtract a linear trend with average growth rate g. Estimation of the above speci…ed AR(1) process with this series yields A = 0:979 and A = 0:0072.
For the non-standard parameters, we calibrate them to match long-run averages of gross aggregate capital ‡ows. Unfortunately, the U.S. National Production and Income Accounts (NIPA) only measures investment ‡ows of new capital goods and then infers aggregate capital stock as the sum of current and past investment ‡ows less depreciation. 21 We thus need to look at …rm-level data of capital ‡ows. One of the …rst studies to do so is Ramey and Shapiro (1998) who use Compustat data to compute gross capital additions and substractions of all publicly traded …rms in the U.S. 22 Consider next the steady state probability of capital allocation q. On the one hand, we know from Section 2 that the hazard rate for di¤erent (relatively liquid) …nished capital goods averages q = 0:86. On the other hand, the vacancy rates for (less liquid) leased industrial and o¢ ce space average 9.5% and 14.5% of total space, respectively. De…ning the corresponding vacancy rate in our model as U=(U + K) = (1 q)L=(U + K) and remembering that gross investment equals m(V; L) = qL, we can back out an average q. For the above gross rate of 0:03875 , we obtain q = 0:27 if we use the vacancy rate of o¢ ce space and q = 0:19 if we use the industrial vacancy rate. These numbers suggest that the average hazard rate is very di¤erent for di¤erent used and new capital goods. For the purpose of our model, we choose an average value of q = 0:5. 
Results
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the IRFs of output, productive capital and hours to a persistent, temporary technology shock for both our capital search model (solid lines) and the RBC benchmark 
increase (since K t and U t are predetermined). Furthermore, since preferences are additive and concave in consumption and the technology shock is persistent, congestion in the capital market t = L t =V t decreases by proposition 1. For the …rst few periods after the shock, this decrease in congestion in the capital market leads to a proportionally more important response of capital stocks than in the RBC benchmark. Yet, as Panel A of Figure 1 shows, the di¤erence is quantitatively negligible and its e¤ect on output is dwarfed by the smaller response of hours. This latter result is due to the larger income e¤ect on labor supply as the decrease in congestion lets the households devote more resources to consumption. Overall, output thus responds slightly less than in the RBC benchmark.
As we document in the appendix, the lack of internal propagation of the capital search model is robust to alternative calibrations of q, ', and . 24 The principal reason for this result is that capital separation and allocation ‡ows implied by our calibration of and s are too small for the countercyclical congestion mechanism to have a sizable e¤ect. To illustrate this point, we resimulate the model with a much larger separation rate of s = 0:15. This would have the counterfactual implication that almost 70% of all capital leaves production in each year (including depreciation) and that average investment ‡ows are equally important. We simply choose this calibration here for expositional purposes and to draw a comparison with Andolfatto (1996) who calibrates his labor search model to the same quarterly separation rate of s = 0:15. 25 As Figure 3 shows, when separation and investment ‡ows are much larger, the countercyclical congestion mechanism starts to matter. To sum up the quantitative evaluation, Table 2 compares the unconditional standard deviation of Hodrick-Prescott …ltered output and autocorrelations of un…ltered output growth of our capital search model with U.S. data and the RBC benchmark. As a by-product, the extension also allows us to assess the role of costly capital reallocation for the business cycle e¤ects of credit frictions. In fact, existing DGE models with credit frictions such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, CF henceforth) or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, BGG henceforth) exclusively focus on the e¤ects of net worth on investment and output. But since factors of production in these models can be moved costlessely from one …rm to another, they abstract by de…nition from the e¤ects of capital reallocation due to …nancial distress.
Model extension
As in CF and BGG, we introduce credit frictions through a costly state veri…cation (CSV) mechanism originally proposed by Townsend (1979) . Firms are subject to a idiosyncratic productivity shock that households (the capital lenders) can only observe after paying a monitoring cost. This assumption of asymmetric information implies that in the absence of monitoring, the …rm would always want to underreport its productivity so as to avoid payment of the previously agreed upon rental rate. Households solve this agency problems with a debt contract that speci…es monitoring and default if the idiosyncratic productivity level of the …rm falls below some optimal threshold.
While we follow the same CSV approach, our model di¤ers from CF and BGG in three important details. First, the optimal default threshold in our model is below the one in CF and BGG because capital reallocation is costly in our model while in CF and BGG, it is not.
Second, we assume as in the baseline model that …rms transfer all of their pro…ts to households at the end of the period. Hence, net worth -the channel through which credit frictions a¤ect investment in CF and BGG -is absent. Third, we retain the assumption that the rental rate is determined so as to split the surplus of the lending relationship. CF and BGG assume instead that the lending market is perfectly competitive and thus, all of the surplus goes to the …rm.
The speci…cs of the extended model are as follows. The representative …rm's technology
where f (X t N t ; K t ) describes the same constant-returns-to-scale function as before, and a t denotes the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. Contrary to the aggregate shock X t , which is known to all participants at the beginning of the period, the shock a t occurs after all optimal decisions have taken place and is only observed by the …rm. As in CF and BGG, we assume that a t is independently and identically distributed over time and follows a lognormal
2 ; 2 log(a) ) so as to ensure a t 2 [0; 1] and E(a) = 1. 27 To deal with the asymmetric information about …rm productivity, households and …rms negotiate the rental rate t per unit of matched capital prior to the realization of a t . If the …rm makes positive pro…ts (i.e. if a t a t where a t is such that a t f (X t N t ; K t ) W t N t t K t V t = 0), the …rm pays t K t , the household refrains from monitoring and the capital match continues. If, on the other hand, a t < a t the …rm is unable to pay the negotiated capital rental because we assume that the wage bill W t N t and the cost of posting vacancies V t need to be covered …rst in order for the …rm to continue operating next period. In this situation, the household pays the monitoring cost to verify the …rm's production and decides on the continuation of the capital match. If a t is above some optimal threshold a t that we derive below, the household takes all of the …rm's production and covers for the totality of W t N t and V t so as to continue the capital match. If instead a t is below the threshold a t , the household separates the match and takes back its capital stock without receiving nor paying anything. In this case, the …rm is liquidated and the di¤erence between production and the cost of W t N t and V t is picked up by an insurance that is funded with the dividends from pro…t-making …rms. 28 Given these assumptions, endogenous separations s e t due to …nancial distress are de…ned as
where H(a) denotes the cumulative density of a. Aside from this endogenous part, we still allow for exogenous (constant) separations that we denote by s x . Hence, the total separation rate is de…ned as
Furthermore, the household's expected gross revenue from matched capital equals
The …rst two terms denote net revenues from continuing relationships. The third term denotes the expected total monitoring cost paid by the household, which we assume to be a …xed proportion > 0 of the defaulting …rms'output. The fourth term corresponds to the value of separated capital returned to the household's budget constraint. In this last term, we assume that the recovery rate of separated capital ' t is time-varying and more speci…cally, that it is a convex function of total endogenous capital separations; i.e. ' t = &(s e t ) with & 0 ( ) < 0 and & 00 ( ) < 0. Two considerations motivate this choice. First, we want to capture industry-speci…c asset illiquidity as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that are otherwise absent in our representative agent model (see discussion in Section 2). Second, the additional ‡exibility a¤orded by this function allows us to match the business cycle dynamics of endogenous capital separations due to …nancial distress.
Consider now the household's optimal choice of a t . It obtains for the level of a t below which re…nancing a …rm is more expensive than severing the lending relationship and incurring the cost of reallocating the capital to another …rm. More formally, we can derive it from the household's 2 8 See the appendix for the details on this insurance. Su¢ ce to say here that we implicitly assume that …rms or capital lenders on their own cannot contract a similar insurance on their own to prevent the …rm from disappearing. 26 optimization problem as (see the appendix for a detailed description)
The left-hand side is the marginal value (in utility terms) of separating and returning the capital unit into the budget constraint for reallocation, where we assume that the representative household takes ' t as exogenous. The right-hand side is the marginal revenue from matched capital plus the marginal value of continuing the match into the future. 29 Conditional on selecting a debt contract, the proposed monitoring and separation scheme is optimal for both parties. The …rm would not gain anything from reporting output below what it actually produced because in case of monitoring, it will loose all output anyway. Likewise, the household would not gain anything from negotiating a higher or lower auditing cuto¤ a t or a separation threshold a t ; by de…nition of the utility-maximizing condition in (16) .
Since any revenues associated with productivity shocks below a t are absorbed either by the capital lender (in case of continuation of the capital match) or by an insurance (in case of capital separation), …rms now maximize only over the positive portion of revenue net of current
As the appendix details, the …rst-order conditions resulting from this objective function would imply substantial overhiring of labor relative to the RBC benchmark and thus an unrealistically high labor share. We correct this implication by assuming, in addition, that the representative …rm in the extended model applies a constant markup 1= 1 on its optimal decision problem. 30 To close the model, we assume as before that the rental rate is determined by Nash bargaining over the surplus of the capital relationship. This rental rate is now conditional on the optimal a t (see appendix)
where t = R 1 a t adH(a) and t = R 1 at adH(a) denote partial expectations. Compared to the case with exogenous separation, the …rst term in brackets is altered to re ‡ect the marginal product of capital and the saved search costs actually accruing to the …rm. The third term in brackets represents the risk premium that arises because households do not receive the full contractual payment t (or even need to reinject money) and pay monitoring costs when the …rm's idiosyncratic shock drops below a t . 31 
Calibration
To compare the extended model with the baseline model where all separations are constant, we keep the common parameters unchanged in a …rst time; i.e. q = 0:5, s = 0:01, = 0:5; and = 0:5. Further below, we perform robustness checks with respect to alternative calibrations.
The additional parameters requiring calibration are the markup of price over marginal cost, 1= , the fraction of output expended on monitoring, , the fraction of capital separation due to …nancial distress, s e =s, and the elasticity (@'=@s e )=(s e =') around steady state. 32 The crucial dimensions we want to match with our calibration are the relative importance and business cycle dynamics of capital separations due to …nancial distress. Since the aforementioned studies on …rm-level capital ‡ows do not report such details, we compute the relevant series ourselves from Compustat data (see appendix for a detailed description of the data). Speci…cally, we treat the following categories as capital separations due to …nancial distress: (i) exits due to liquidation (chapter 7); (ii) sales during the years (-1 0 1 2) around bankruptcy …lings (chapter 11); and (iii) sales during the years (-1 0 1 2) around drops of more than 2 credit ratings in long term debt. Compustat provides information on the reasons of exit for disappearing …rms 3 1 Broadly speaking, this risk premium is the consequence of incomplete contracting in a world with ex-post factor speci…city that Williamson (1979) and more recently Caballero and Hammour (1996) term the fundamental transformation problem. The general equilibrium consquence is reduced ‡exibility of separation decisions and, in turn, a slower capital accumulation process. 3 2 Since we loglinearize the model, the other functional characteristics of ' = g(s e ) are irrelevant.
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as well as information about debt ratings of continuing …rms. To identify …rm bankruptcies, we link the Compustat database with information on chapter 11 …lings from the Bankruptcy Research Database. 33 Total separations (de…ned as sales and exits) and retirements, in turn, are computed as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). 34 Table 3 provides the thus computed averages for the sample 1980-1993. 35 In line with Ramey and Shapiro (1998), retirements make up roughly two thirds of all separations while sales and exits make up about one third. 36 Sales and exits due to …nancial distress make up only 6% of total capital separations (and only 4.6% for the 1980-2004 period), which amounts to 0.15% of average capital stocks. The series is countercyclical, in line with the aforementioned evidence on the cyclicality of …nancial distress, and about two and a half times as volatile as output. To roughly match these characteristics, we calibrate s e =s = 0:05 and set (@'=@s e )=(s e =') such that the relative volatility of s e in the model coincides with the one in the data.
For the other two additional parameters, we choose 1= = 1=0:8 = 25% and set the monitoring cost parameter to = 0:05. 37 . The resulting long-run ratios of interest are the following:
the consumption-output ratio equals 73:13%, which is in line with King and Rebelo (2000) ; the labor share equals 74%, which corresponds to estimates reported by Gollin (2002) ; the average annualized risk premium equals 3:56%, which lies in-between the spread of the post-war average Aaa corporate bond yield over the 3-month Treasury bill (1.87%) and the post-war average equity risk premium for the U.S. (7.58%); and pro…ts (dividends) relative to output equal 8:9%, which is somewhat too high compared to the evidence reported in Basu and Fernald (1997) . 38 Before continuing, we return to Table 4 to consider the overall behavior of sales and exits.
Both series are procyclical and especially exits are highly volatile relative to output. This latter result is due to the large variations in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that account for most of capital separations in the Compustat data. 39 Somewhat counterfactually, we omit these variations in our extended model and instead assume this part of capital separations to be constant. The reason for this omission is two-fold. First, as the below quantitative analysis shows, even small countercyclical capital separations due to credit frictions can have substantial e¤ects in general equilibrium. Second, the procyclical nature of sales and M&A is likely to be the result of reallocation towards more e¢ cient …rms in the wake of technological change (e.g. Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004) . Our representative agent framework is designed, by de…nition, to quantify the e¤ects of search frictions on their own but does not allow us to consider reallocation costs in conjunction with persistent productivity di¤erences. As we discuss in the conclusion of 3 7 A great deal of controversy surrounds the costs related to bankruptcy. In our model, this cost should only entail the direct costs related to monitoring and reorganization. We therefore set it to a value that is well below estimates of direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy that seem to lie between 20 and 35% of output. See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for a discussion. As robustness checks in the appendix reveal, the value of has little in ‡uence on the dynamics of our model. 3 8 Other values of interest implied by our calibration but for which we do not have any empirical counterparts are: an average cost of posting vacancies relative to output equal to v =y = 2:22%, and a standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock equal to a = 0:33. 3 9 The procyclicality of M&A is consistent with evidence reported in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) . They use LRD data and …nd that change in ownership of large manufacturing plants is highly procyclical.
30 the paper, this is an interesting avenue for future research.
Quantitative evaluation
As in Section 4, we start our quantitative evaluation by considering IRFs to a persistent but temporary technology shock. As is immediately apparent from Figure 3 , the extended capital matching model (solid lines) generates a substantially ampli…ed response of output and hours compared to the RBC benchmark (dotted lines). As an indirect e¤ect of the drop in capital separations, households now …nd it optimal to allocate more resources to new investment than in the baseline model with constant separations.
Compared to the RBC model, consumption thus reacts less on impact, which results in a smaller income e¤ect on labor supply. In addition, the more important reaction of productive capital implies that the marginal product of labor and thus labor demand increases more rapidly in the periods after the shock than in the RBC model. The conjunction of these two general equilibrium e¤ects leads to a substantially larger response of equilibrium hours and, as the ensuing analysis reveals, this is what explains most of the increased internal ampli…cation of output relative to the RBC benchmark. Table 4 presents prominent unconditional second moments for U.S. postwar data, the RBC benchmark, the baseline capital search model with exogenous separations as well as the extended capital search model with endogenous separation. For this last case, we report two cases: one for = 0:5, as used so far, and one for = 0:25. As we will see, the calibration of this parameter now has important implications. Consider …rst the case where = 0:5. As indicated by the IRFs, this version of the extended model generates substantial ampli…cation of output relative to the RBC benchmark. As for persistence, however, the model still fails to generate the marked positive autocorrelation of output growth that we see in the data (see Table 5 below). The increase in internal ampli…cation is rooted in the general equilibrium e¤ects on labor supply and labor demand that result in more volatile dynamics of hours. Interestingly, both the zero pro…t threshold a t and the separation threshold a t are countercyclical, which implies, in turn, that the model generates a countercyclical risk premium. Although the ‡uctuations of this premium are not as volatile in the data, this result is a signi…cant success of our extended model over the RBC benchmark as well as over standard credit friction models without costly capital reallocation (see below).
Closer inspection of Table 4 reveals that the more volatile dynamics of equilibrium hours come at the cost of countercyclical consumption, which is clearly at odds with the data. In fact, the negative income e¤ect brought about by the drop in capital separations is so strong that households choose to decrease their consumption on impact. These consumption dynamics hinge 33 crucially on the elasticity that links the matching probability q( t ) to the congestion measure t . 40 For = 0:5, the response of q( t ) is relatively large. We thus recalibrate = 0:25 so as to roughly match the consumption dynamics in the data. The last column of Table 4 reports the results. Consumption is now procyclical and almost as volatile as in the data. The consequence of this adjustment is a much smaller income e¤ect on labor supply, which reduces the standard deviation of output to 1.28 -a value just slightly above the RBC benchmark.
This exercise makes clear that the interplay between time-consuming capital (re-)allocation and countercyclical capital separation leads to ampli…cation by a¤ecting the response of hours supplied by households. Exogenous shocks not only a¤ect the factor productivity as in the RBC benchmark, but also the stock of productive capital and the amount of resources that need to go through the time-consuming allocation process. The time-varying capital separation rate limits the income e¤ect of rising returns to capital, thus inducing households to shift more resources away from consumption towards investment and supplying more hours. However, once we calibrate the model to yield reasonable consumption dynamics, we …nd that these e¤ects are modest and result only in a small increase in internal ampli…cation.
Assessing the e¤ect of removing search frictions
To further illustrate the interplay between search frictions and countercyclical capital separations, we remove the search friction from the model. As in the RBC benchmark, this corresponds to a situation where = 0 and ' t = 1. Firms thus post an in…nity of new projects in every period and the probability of allocating a liquid unit of capital to a …rm becomes q( t ) = 1.
Households still monitor …rms that cannot make the negotiated rental payment and separate the lending relationship with …rms whose revenues fall below their wage bill. In other words, households are no longer willing to reinject funds to keep a lending relationship alive because reallocating capital is now costless. Despite this change in optimal separation decision, the rental rate still involves a risk premium that takes into account the expected cost of monitoring. 41 in CF and BGG, this risk premium a¤ects the price of capital and thus investment. The extended model without search frictions generates less internal ampli…cation than the model with both frictions. The reason for this decrease of internal ampli…cation is that separated capital can now be reallocated costlessely and immediately. The only thing that sets apart the extended model without search frictions from the RBC benchmark is the countercyclical risk premium. After a positive shock, this premium decreases in our model because less …rms are expected to default. This leads to a slightly more important investment boom at the expense of consumption. The resulting smaller income e¤ect on labor supply implies that equilibrium hours and thus output react more than in the RBC model. However, this di¤erence is minimal.
i denotes the risk premium (which depends on conditional expectations t+1 and t+1 associated with the monitoring and separation thresholds, and the optimal separation threshold is now determined by a t f (XtNt; Kt) WtNt = 0): In the RBC benchmark without credit market frictions, by contrast, the marginal product of capital equals Etf t+1 [fK (Xt+1Nt+1; Kt+1) + 1 ]g = t. Compared to the BGG model and the CF model, our extended model with credit frictions succeeds in generating countercyclical default and countercyclical risk premia, independent of whether the search friction is present or not. 43 This di¤erence is due to the absence of net worth in our model. 44 As shown in Covas and Den Haan (2006) , …rms in the BGG and CF models seek to increase their capital immediately in response to a positive technology shock even though their net worth adjusts only sluggishly. The resulting increase in their debt to net worth ratio implies that monitoring by lenders in an upturn actually increases, which in turn pushes up the external …nance premium. This implies an increase in the monitoring and separation threshold, thus exerting upward pressure on the risk premium.
Volatility of separations and robustness to alternative calibrations
As highlighted by the above results, a crucial ingredient for the marked internal propagation of our extended model is the income e¤ect on labor supply whereby households withhold current consumption to …nance capital investments. The following robustness checks assess to what extent alternative calibrations a¤ect the performance of the model. In all of these exercises, we keep = 0:25 so as to roughly match the consumption dynamics in the data and adjust the elasticity (@'=@s e )=(s e =') such as to keep the relative volatility of s e consistent with the Compustat data. Table 6 reports the results. the CF model succeeds in generating some persistence in output growth. The reason for this result is that the CF model applies the credit friction only to the investment goods producing sector whereas the BGG model applies the friction to the entire economy. 4 4 Another di¤erence is that in the BGG and CF models, lenders who sever the …nancing relationship can walk away with any revenue net of wage payments whereas in our model, this is not the case. This is why the monitoring threshold coincides with the separation threshold in the BGG and CF models; i.e. there is no chapter 11. Autocorrelations of growth rates are un…ltered.
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Changes in q ( ) ; and s e =s (keeping s = 0:01) have essentially no impact on the dynamics of the model. 45 This result would even hold if we didn't adjust (@'=@s e )=(s e =') so as to keep The dynamics of the model are more sensitive to changes in the average separation rate s. For example, when we calibrate s = 0:02 per quarter (keeping s e =s at 0:05), the standard deviation of output rises to (y) = 1:62. The mechanism for this increase in ampli…cation is the same than before. The larger average s implies that the drop in separated capital after a positive technology shock is more important and thus, households divert more resources away from consumption in order to achieve the desired amount of liquid capital. The resulting negative income e¤ect increases the volatility of hours, thus leading to an ampli…ed output response. As before, however, this e¤ect is accompanied by a negative correlation of consumption with output.
If we correct this counterfactual implication by lowering even more, the ampli…cation of output is reduced substantially.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there are several calibrations for which the extended capital search model generates both important ampli…cation and persistence e¤ects. For example, if we set the elasticity (@'=@s e )=(s e =') = 0 (i.e. ' is constant) and = 0:5, we obtain (y) = 1:52, corr( y; y 1 ) = 0:28 and corr( y; y 2 ) = 0:08 without counterfactual consumption dynamics (see appendix for details). This marked improvement in internal propagation is due to an overly volatile endogenous separation rate (more than a 1000 times as volatile than output).
This illustrates that the combination of search frictions for physical capital and countercyclical capital separations due to credit frictions leads at least in principle to more important business cycle ‡uctuations. The issue is simply that the ‡ows of physical capital in and out of production are not large and not volatile enough for these e¤ects to play a substantial role.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the business cycle consequences of search frictions for the allocation of physical capital. The investigation is motivated by …rm-and industry-level evidence on market imperfections in the allocation of physical capital. Despite the fundamentally di¤erent nature of physical capital and labor, we argue that the market imperfections involved in the allocation of these two factors are quite similar. We thus consider our paper as a …rst step towards analyzing capital allocation with the same type of search frictions that have proven fruitful for our understanding of labor markets. By the same token, we propose a complementary view to existing models of investment that focus on aggregate adjustment costs and building delays in a world with perfect markets.
The capital search model that we develop generates countercyclical congestion in physical capital markets, in line with the data. Our analysis in a modern DGE context suggests, however, that for reasonable calibrations, the internal propagation e¤ects of these search frictions are modest. The main reason for this lack of internal propagation is quantitative: separation and reallocation ‡ows of physical capital are too small for the search friction to play a signi…cant role.
This conclusion remains intact when we extend the model with credit market frictions that result in countercyclical capital separations. While the combination of countercyclical separations and imperfect capital (re-) allocation increases internal propagation, almost all of these e¤ects stem from a general equilibrium income e¤ect that these frictions have on labor supply. Once we tie down the model to generate consumption dynamics in line with the data, we …nd that capital separations due to …nancial distress are simply not important and volatile enough for them to generate signi…cant internal propagation.
Our results provide an interesting contrast to Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) who
show that the introduction of countercyclical job destruction in a labor search model substantially magni…es and prolongs the business cycle e¤ects of small shocks. This di¤erence in results is mainly due to the fact that labor is twice as important of an input to production as capital and that job destructions ‡uctuate on average much more over the business cycle than capital separations. Furthermore, job destructions overall are countercyclical while for capital separations, only the part linked to …nancial distress is countercyclical. This part makes up only a small fraction of all capital reallocations, which explains why its impact is so limited.
The comparison suggest that capital reallocations due to sales and M&A are a more important source of internal propagation. From our …rm-level data, we know that most capital reallocations occur through these two channels and are substantially more volatile than capital reallocations due to …nancial distress. The problem is that sales and M&A are procyclical rather than countercyclical and thus, they would not generate more important business cycle dynamics in the proposed representative agent framework. At the same time, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) argue that sales and M&A of capital are often the consequence of reorganization in the aftermath of embodied technological progress. Hence, combining embodied technological progress in a heterogenous …rm framework with search frictions for the reorganization of physical capital could entail important internal propagation e¤ects as it takes time for …rms and sectors to reallocate factors of production to their most productive use. 46 
